The Curious Case of Freeman Dyson and the Paranormal by Dentith, Matthew
IN A 2007 ARTICLE POSTED ON EDGE
(www.edge.org/3rd_culture/dysonf07_index.html ),
a prestigious web page where scientists debate
controversial issues, the famous theoretical physi-
cist and raconteur Freeman Dyson stated once
again that he is proud to be a heretic in regard
to “fashionable scientific dogmas.”
The public is led to believe that the fashionable
scientific dogmas are true, and it may sometimes
happen that they are wrong. That is why heretics
who question dogmas are needed.
Dyson expressed his love of scientific heresy
earlier in a 2006 New York Review of Books essay
entitled “The Scientist as Rebel,” which is littered
with skepticism for fashionable scientific dogmas,
especially reductionism, the idea that all knowl-
edge about the world can be reduced to a sophis-
ticated understanding of natural law. Although
Dyson admits that the reductionist programme has
yielded great successes, he is concerned that
reductionism has become a fashionable dogma
that ignores the possibility that holistic solutions
might also be necessary for advancing knowledge:
If we try to squeeze science into a single philo-
sophical viewpoint such as reductionism, we are
like Procrustes chopping the feet of his guests
when they do not fit onto his bed. Science flourish-
es best when it uses freely all the tools at hand,
unconstrained by preconceived notions of what sci-
ence ought to be.
An example of Dyson’s heretical thoughts
about reductionism can be found in his attitude
towards claims of the paranormal. Another New
York Review of Books essay includes Dyson’s
largely positive review of Georges Charpak’s and
Henri Broch’s book Debunked!, but he expresses
skepticism for their claim that since paranormal
phenomena cannot be studied scientifically, they
do not exist. Dyson rejects the reductionist
dogma that all such phenomena can be reduced
to phenomena of natural sciences and that, fur-
thermore, paranormal phenomena are examples
of where such reductionist programmes break
down.
I would like to offer a cautious defense of
Dyson’s skepticism about reductionism. I take it
that Dyson is arguing against an increasingly
common form of skepticism, one that denies the
occurrence of paranormal phenomena because
such phenomena are meant to be contrary to
what we know about nature. I will consider
what a charitable interpretation of his argument
should look like, drawing upon the distinction
between what is rational to believe and what is.
The question Dyson asks, in essence, is this:
Can we reduce our beliefs about such things as
the paranormal to those kinds of things governed
by the laws of the natural sciences? With this in
mind, it seems to me that there are three ways
we can charitably interpret Dyson’s skepticism
about reducibility claims.
1. We should not rely too heavily on simplicity.
One way to interpret Dyson’s claim about irre-
ducibility is to focus on methodological reduc-
tionism. This is the claim that “small is beautiful.”
That is, simple explanations, using the concepts
from the natural sciences, provide the best strate-
gy to explain phenomena.
Compare two hypothetical theories of gravity.
One of them is slightly more complex because it
contains an extra term that does no work. It
seems quite clear that we should prefer the less
complex theory because the additional complexi-
ty adds no explanatory power. Now, while I
think we should prefer simple belief structures
that describe known phenomena (and I think we
will find that the scientific endeavor provides
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such systems) the notion that simpler systems
reflect what is happening behind the scenes is
highly contentious. If we select a simpler theory
over a more complex one
with the same explanatory
power, then this choice
may be motivated by
purely aesthetic reasons.
We should be aware that
such an aesthetic judgment
does not allow us to say
that this simpler theory is a
more accurate description
of what is going on
behind the scenes. 
Applying Occam’s
Razor we should prefer
the simpler theory but, if
we were omniscient, we
might well find that the
more complex theory,
with its extra term, is still the more accurate
description of what is going on behind the
scenes. The extra term may pick out some entity
or aspect that, even though it does not interact
with its surroundings, is part of the complete
story of how the world is. As such, more com-
plex theories about the operation of the world,
such as those put forward by paranormalists,
should not be dismissed just because they are
more complex yet no more testable than their
cousins in the natural sciences.
2. We should not be chauvinistic.
While we cannot conceive of a world where the
fundamentals of math or logic are different, I
believe that we can coherently imagine a world
that operates according to physical principles
other than the ones posited by our current under-
standing of the natural sciences. What we take to
be the laws of nature might only describe what
we experience and such experiences could be
reconciled with other, different, descriptions of
the world. In other words, these putative laws of
nature might not be an accurate representation of
the natural world in its entirety; they might only
be descriptions of best fit for the observations we
have made. Such putative laws do not guarantee
us knowledge of what is really going on.
Dyson’s claim about the irreducibility of the
paranormal to the scientific could be taken to be
the distinction between what we can be reason-
ably expected to believe in and what actually
exists. Indeed, following Dyson’s logic, it is plausi-
ble that there are some phenomena behind the
scenes that we might
never have any way of
knowing about (either due
to never being in a posi-
tion to experience them or
because our contemporary
systematic accounts of
these phenomena do not
allow knowledge). If this
is a plausible claim, then
such explanations of best
fit appeal to what we can
justifiably believe but not
necessarily to what really
happens.
This construal of
Dyson’s argument does
not try to make all such
theories, such as those about the paranormal,
suddenly plausible. What it does tell us is that it
is conceivable to claim that there are some forces
that we might not know about which, in turn,
might explain the existence of some phenomena
considered paranormal.
3. There exist different languages.
We could consider Dyson’s rejection of a reduc-
tionist account of paranormal phenomena to be
a language issue. What if the language of the
natural sciences cannot describe certain phenom-
ena. You would either have to think that such
phenomena do not exist or you would need to
admit to there being some other language that
does describe them.
The language that is English has a grammar,
syntax and so forth. All these things apply to the
objects that make up English; the words. In the
same way we can also talk about more formal
languages like those in the natural sciences.
Unlike English speakers, scientists will find very
few synonyms for the things they describe.
Although I can describe a sunset in almost end-
less ways, the language in which the scientist
describes the electron is limited. This is because
the words and rules of the language of science
are far stricter.
I think that Dyson’s non-reductionist/holistic
account could be interpreted as casting doubt on
the intuition that the language of the natural
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sciences can describe all phenomena. Consider
the distinction between the social sciences and
the natural sciences. Can we redescribe social
phenomena in purely naturalistic terms? Can pol-
itics be reduced to and described by the lan-
guage of physics? In this interpretation, reduc-
tions cannot be made “good” because there is
something very different about the expressive
resources available to the language of the social
sciences. This difference is often identified in
respect to regularities; we think that the regulari-
ties of the natural sciences reflect universal and
necessary rules, while the regularities of the
social sciences are likely only to be true for arbi-
trary reasons.
Consider the divide between the microscopic
and the macroscopic views of reality. The world
we have direct experience of is the macroscopic.
As far as we have been able to ascertain it works
on determinate, mechanical principles that seem
best shown in our understanding of the natural
sciences. There are also microscopic phenomena:
quanta together with, perhaps, an attendant inde-
terminacy. Yet both domains exist, and the world
as we experience it, the macroscopic, is built on
and above the microscopic world. Somehow any
indeterminacy of the micro gets translated into
the determinacy of our macro-level world.
The point of this is that we seem to have two
different languages, the micro and the macro,
which, when combined, are a theoretically full
account of the scientific/naturalistic world.
Theories that cross from one language to
another need a guiding principle to explain how
one set of terms can be linked to another set of
terms. If we want to explain the relation of
micro-level events to macro-level events then we
want some bridging principle. In the same way,
if social science theories are instances of acciden-
tal regularities while those of the natural sciences
are not, then, plausibly, we want to know how
to relate accidental regularities to laws of nature
when we make claims that go from the social to
the natural.
One way to look at this problem is to postu-
late a “Third Language.” Imagine, if you will, that
there is a language that describes perfectly what
we call the micro and macro-physical, but that
this language is unknown to us. Possibly the lan-
guage may never be known; it might be struc-
tured in such a way that we could never work it
out, or to properly formulate it we would need
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to experience certain phenomena to which we
have no epistemic access. Nonetheless, this Third
Language would tell us how the things we call
microscopic interact with the things we call
macroscopic.
The terms microscopic and macroscopic are
unlikely to be terms in this Third Language;
instead they are terms used by two other lan-
guages to describe each other. In their own
domains each respective language is perfectly
useful but they present problems if they are used
to try and describe phenomena in another
domain, to whit—macroscopic attempts to
describe microscopic events. A Third Language
would achieve this by being the one true lan-
guage of completed physics.
If the paranormal has a language of its own,
it may well be irreducible to (which is to say
“may not be translatable into”) the language of
the natural sciences. If such a thing as the Third
Language exists, then the complete description of
the world would be found in it. The paranormal,
then, would not be subject to the laws of the
natural sciences but rather the laws of the natural
sciences and the paranormal would be subject to
the laws described in the Third Language.
The Normal and the Paranormal
That there exists some experience of things some
people call “paranormal” is undeniable. What can
be contested is whether such experiences are of
processes that are incompatible with what we take
to be the laws of nature. Most reports of paranor-
mal activity can be redescribed, with some ease,
into instances of already known natural processes
simply experienced in an unusual way.
It seems possible, however, that this process
of redescription might leave behind a small set of
phenomena that do not belong to the domain of
the natural sciences. Such a set of phenomena
might well be considered contra to the natural
sciences and may be called “spooky” or “para-
normal.” What are these phenomena?
One answer is that the phenomena belong to
a more complex, but no more testable, theory of
knowledge. This relates to the first interpretation
of Dyson’s irreducibility claim. Another option is
that the phenomena belong to a stronger and
more testable theory that fits the world better
than the theories of the natural sciences. This
relates to the second interpretation. Either way,
we prefer simple, testable systems, but we
should not assume that these simple and testable
systems we advocate in the natural sciences pres-
ent the full story of the way the world works.
Just because our descriptions do not admit to
there being paranormal phenomena does not
mean that the phenomena do not occur.
A third answer is that paranormal phenomena
are phenomena that are just not describable in
the language of the natural sciences but that this
does not mean that such phenomena are in any-
way counter-rational or counter-intuitive. One ver-
sion of this kind of reasoning appeals to a Third
Language in which languages, such as the micro,
the macro, the social and possibly even the para-
normal, are adequately described and explained.
I believe that if we are charitable in our inter-
pretation of Dyson’s argument, then there is some
merit to a claim about the irreducibility of the
paranormal to the scientific. That said, there are
two things that need to be kept in mind when
considering these options. One is that just
because it is logically possible that there are some
phenomena not described by the natural sci-
ences, we should not assume that such phenom-
ena exist. As well, we cannot exclude the possi-
bility that there are some phenomena to which
we have no epistemic access; our theories of
knowledge could be (forever?) incomplete. It is
possible (which is different from the claim that is
probable) that this is the case with at least some
phenomena we call paranormal. Such paranormal
phenomena would thus be outside the realm of
the natural sciences but not necessarily in direct
conflict with them. Indeed, this is the position that
Freeman Dyson seems to support. 
The second, and, to my mind, more important
point about the possible irreducibility of the para-
normal to the normal, is that even if these phe-
nomena did exist and were called paranormal,
this would not mean that such phenomena would
have to be in any way spooky. Such phenomena
would still act in a coherent and consistent way
because they would be subject to the actions and
interactions dictated by logic. Such phenomena
might never be described by the laws of nature,
or such phenomena might require that we
expand our current understanding of such laws,
but it would not be counter-rational to hold such
beliefs. 
This explains, I believe, the curious case of
Freeman Dyson’s “heresy” in respect to the para-
normal.
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